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The Application of General Strain Theory and Rational
Choice Theory to the Complex Topic of Terrorism
Working Paper One – Capstone
Rhianna Hayes
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Defining Terrorism
Terrorism is an instantly recognizable word that provokes a visceral sense of anger, fear,
and in some cases, revenge. Everyone has a different interpretation of what the word terrorism
means, and that is true for the public, legal, and academic worlds. Many competing definitions of
what terrorism is and what it means to be a terrorist exists within the literature. This makes an
already complex topic to study even more difficult to analyze and address.
In the academic and legal world, the definition of terrorism is still up for debate. There is
no current consensus on how to define terrorism, but most definitions focus on the fact that
terrorism involves an act of violence to perpetuate a political agenda.
An example of an academic version of the meaning of terrorism states that terrorism is the
“premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a
political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of their
immediate victims” (Enders & Sandler, 2018). Many academic definitions share this sentiment,
although they are not exactly the same. Legal definitions are similar to academic definitions, but
they have a few key nuanced variations
Similarly, legal definitions are very similar to one another, but they have nuanced
variations. This is seen through the fact that every law enforcement agency has a definition of
terrorism that is slightly different from one another. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) defines domestic terrorism as “perpetrated by individuals and/or groups
inspired by or associated with primarily US-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies
of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature” (Terrorism, 2016), and they
define international terrorism as “perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or
associated with designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored)”
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(Terrorism, 2016). This definition is slightly different from the United States Army Manual that
defines terrorism as the “calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of violence to inculcate
fear. It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies…[to attain] political,
religious, or ideological goals” (A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,
2007). Another example of a legal definition comes from the United Nations Security Council. In
Resolution 1566, the United Nations Security Council defines terrorism as any “criminal act,
including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or
taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror, or compel a government or
international organizations to do or to abstain from doing any act which contravened terrorismrelated conventions and protocols…of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, or
religious nature” (Security Council Acts Unanimously to Adopt Resolution…).
As can be seen by the aforementioned definitions of terrorism listed above, terrorism can
be defined in a variety of ways. These definitions largely focus on international terrorism, which
is the focus of my Capstone Project as a whole. The common aspect of each definition is the
focus on violence perpetrated by individuals in the name of politics, ideology, or religion. For
my Capstone Project Papers, when terrorism is discussed it will be referring to a political tactic
that involves the use or threat of violence in order to achieve a defined political, social, or
religious agenda (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011). This definition is very broad, but for this literature
review and the following working papers, it makes the most sense to keep the definition broad so
that the same definition is consistent among all papers to minimize confusion on what is being
discussed. However, it is important to note that among the academic and legal literature the
definitions vary from being even broader to overly specific when explaining terrorism.
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Over the course of this Capstone Project, I would also like to note that terrorism is being
used to refer to international instances of terrorism perpetrated by largely Islamic terrorist
organizations. Given the broad definition that will be utilized, it is important to make this
distinction because many other acts perpetrated by individuals or organizations could be
classified as terrorism. However, for this project, the word terrorism will apply to groups such as
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), and subsequent terrorist groups that are Islamic.

Introduction
Terrorism is a complex topic to study. There is no consensus on what the word terrorism
means, and there is even less consensus on why groups of people go out of their way to use
terrorism as a form of political expression. Various analyses and studies have been conducted to
attempt to explain this complex topic. Many of these studies have drawn from criminal justice
research to apply criminological theories as an explanation for terrorism. The application of
criminological theories provides one baseline for people to attempt to understand terrorism. At
first glance, it may seem that criminological theories will not be able to explain why terrorist
organizations function in the way that they do, but many consider acts of terror to be criminal
acts as well. If acts of terror are considered criminal acts than it only makes sense that
criminological theories can be used as a way to explain this violent form of political expression.
Multiple criminological theories can be used to explain terrorism, but this paper will focus on
applying Robert Agnew’s General Strain Theory (1992) and Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V.
Clarke’s Rational Choice Theory (1986)
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General Strain Theory
In 1992, Robert Agnew developed General Strain Theory to address criticisms leveled
against previous versions of strain-based theories. Of these theories, Agnew (1992) was
influenced heavily by Robert Merton’s theory of Anomie and Strain (1938). He expanded upon
Merton’s theory to focus explicitly on negative factors, such as negative treatment by others and
experiencing negative emotions, and the role that these factors can play in criminal behavior.
General Strain Theory posits that experiencing strain, or stress, tends to generate negative
emotions including anger, frustration, depression, despair, and anxiety, which are capable of
creating pressures for some type of corrective action. Oftentimes this corrective action will take
the form of legal coping mechanisms, but in certain cases corrective action takes the form of
crime and delinquency (Brezina, 2017).
In 2010, Agnew revised General Strain Theory to include a definition of strain that
includes any event or condition that an individual dislikes. Under this broadened definition, three
major types of strain were delineated. The first major type of strain that was delineated is the
inability of an individual to successfully achieve their goals, also known as goal blockage. Many
forms of goal blockage can have a detrimental effect on an individual’s emotions, such as
experiencing strain in the form of anger and frustration if they are unable to fulfill their goals and
aspirations, cannot achieve the expected outcome of their actions, or fail to achieve what they
interpret as a fair and just outcome. Goal blockage can also resort to an individual experiencing
strain if they are unable to achieve the highly valued goals of respect, masculine status,
autonomy, and the desire for excitement (Brezina, 2017). These goals are especially important to
younger males who put a great deal of pressure on themselves to appear better than they are, so
when they are unable to achieve their idea of who they should be, they experience a great amount
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of strain. The second and third major types of strain involve the presence of negatively valued
stimuli and/or the absence of positively valued stimuli. When individuals are harassed or bullied
by their peers, experience negative relations with their parents or teachers, are presented with
undesirable circumstances, or are the victim of crime, they are exposed to negatively valued
stimuli that create strain. In contrast, individuals are exposed to strain through the loss of
positively valued stimuli, such as exposure to undesirable events and experiences, loss of
property, or the death of a loved one (Brezina, 2017). These three major types of strain have the
potential to create a situation in which an individual will resort to crime and delinquency to
alleviate the emotions that they are experiencing.
In addition to these three categories of major strains, strains can be further specified and
identified into strains that are said to be the most relevant predictor of offending behavior. These
strains include those that are high in magnitude, seen as unjust, associated with low social
control, and can be readily resolved through crime. Strains that are high in magnitude are further
specified by their severity, frequency, duration, and the level of importance to the individual
experiencing them (Brezina, 2017). Examples of strains that meet these conditions include
parental rejection and abuse, excessive discipline, negative experiences in school, being the
victim of harassment by peers, criminal victimization, marital problems, persistent
unemployment, racial discrimination, homelessness, residence in economically deprived
neighborhoods, and the failure to satisfy strong desires for money, excitement, masculinity, and
recognition. Research has indicated that many of the strains mentioned above are directly related
to criminal activity (Brezina, 2017).
Experiencing strains increase the likelihood of individuals experiencing negative
emotions, which in turn increases the risk of engaging in criminal and delinquent behavior. The
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negative emotions that are fostered by collective strains, such as anger, resentment, anxiety,
depression, and despair are said to generate pressures for corrective action (Brezina, 2017).
Corrective action can take place in the form of legal or illegal behavior. Strains create a series of
negative emotions that are experienced by an individual. Some individuals may respond to
negative emotions in positive ways, by seeking out legal coping mechanisms that will allow
them to resolve what they are feeling, while other individuals turn to illegal means. Those who
are more likely to resort to illegal, or deviant, coping mechanisms are those who have a lack of
coping resources, lack of a conventional support system, few opportunities for conventional
coping, ample opportunities for criminal coping, low social control, and a strong predisposition
for criminal behavior (Brezina, 2017). Individuals who do not have legitimate ways to cope with
the strains they are experiencing are more likely to resort to criminal behavior because it
provides them with an outlet to address the source of the strain and potentially alleviate the
negative emotions that they are experiencing because of that strain. Negative emotions are
experienced in dramatically different ways from one individual to another, so it is hard to predict
how each person will respond to the stressors in their lives. However, research has shown that
the more closely tied an individual is to the conventional norms of society, the more likely they
are to abstain from criminal behavior when they experience negative emotions.

General Strain Theory Applied to Terrorism
Agnew’s (2010) General Strain Theory applies to the study of terrorism for a variety of
reasons. This theory can help explain why terrorists commit acts of violence to further their
political agenda and accomplish their objectives. General Strain Theory states that individuals
will resort to criminal behavior when they are under a great deal of strain or stress. Not all
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individuals will resort to criminal behavior as a result of the strains they are facing, but for some
individuals, criminal behavior is the only option for them to combat what they are dealing with.
In regards to terrorism, this theory believes that terrorism is most likely to result when
individuals or groups are under a variety of collective strains. Terrorism is most likely to occur
when people are experiencing collective strains that are high in magnitude, unjust, and when they
are inflicted by significantly more powerful people that are deemed as the “others” (Agnew,
2010). This concept of collective strain readily applies to terrorism and provides a possible
explanation as to why terrorists resort to violence.
Agnew (2010) believed that the tenets of General Strain Theory could be used to provide
a potential explanation for terrorism. Using aspects of his original theory, Agnew (2010) presents
a theory of general strain that can be applied to the topic of terrorism by reviewing, critiquing,
and building on current strain-based explanations that have previously been used to attempt to
explain why individuals resort to terrorism. He posits that current strain-based explanations of
terrorism fail to fully describe the core characteristics of strains that are the most likely to lead to
terrorism, why certain types of strains increase the likelihood of terrorism, and why such a small
number of individuals who are exposed to strain decide to engage in terrorism (Agnew, 2010).
General strain theories of terrorism believe that terrorism is most likely to occur when
individuals are experiencing collective strains that are high in magnitude, perceived to be unjust,
and that is inflicted by a significantly more powerful “other”. When an individual is experiencing
these types of collective strains, they are more likely to engage in terrorism because the strains
typically increase negative emotions, such as anger and frustration, reduce social control, reduce
the ability to cope through conventional means, create an outlet for the social learning of
terrorism and contributes to a collective orientation and response that views terrorism as
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necessary and normal (Agnew, 2010). In other words, collective strains serve as a uniting force
for those who are experiencing them, which creates the perfect atmosphere for the development
of terrorism. Like-minded individuals who are all experience high amounts of collective strain
are far more likely to resort to terrorism than their counterparts who are not experiencing these
strains. Collective strains increase the likelihood of an individual choosing to engage in
terrorism, but that does not mean that every individual who experiences these collective strains
will resort to terrorism. For example, those who have conventional ties to society are less likely
to engage in terrorism, even when they are experiencing collective strains when compared to
those who do not have conventional ties to society.
Agnew is not the only scholar who has applied General Strain Theory to terrorism.
Nivette, Eisner, and Ribeaud (2017) have also used strain theory as an explanation for why
people engage in terrorism. This group of scholars focus on specific examples of collective
strains that are high in magnitude, perceived as unjust, and inflicted by more powerful others.
Individuals who are exposed to prolonged instances of political violence, in the form of conflict,
terrorism, and/or war, are more likely to experience the collective strains that are listed above.
Individuals experiencing these types of strains for a prolonged amount of time are more likely to
engage in terrorism as a way to combat the negative emotions created by experiencing these
strains (Nivette, Eisner, & Ribeaud, 2017).
These collective strains can fuel feelings of anger, frustration, anxiety, and depression,
among other negative emotions, which can drive individuals to do whatever they deem necessary
to alleviate these stressors, and in some cases, this leads to terrorism. In this way, collective
strains can be viewed as a direct cause, or motivation, for engagement in terrorist organizations
and activities. In order to display the impact that negative emotions caused by collective strains
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can have on individuals, Kayaoglu (2008) conducted a case study of Turkish Hezbollah
members. This case study serves to show how General Strain Theory can be applied to terrorist
organization members to see if the cumulative effects of strains on the violent behaviors
exhibited by terrorists could be identified. The Kayaoglu (2008) used quantitative methods in the
form of bivariate and multivariate analysis, and qualitative methods were used to mediate the
effect of negative emotions as well. The result of this case study shows that Turkish Hezbollah
members are more likely to engage in violent acts of terrorism when they have experienced
higher levels of strain when compared to individuals who have experienced lower levels of strain
(Kayaoglu, 2008). This case study provides important support for the application of General
Strain Theory to terrorism, by showing that experiencing higher levels of collective strain are
more likely to result in violent behavior and participation in terrorist activities.
Although applying General Strain Theory to terrorism appears to make a great deal of
sense, some scholars are critical of this approach. Jalata (2010) is one such scholar who is very
critical of strain-based explanations of terrorism. His main criticism is that the theory does not
adequately address the complexities of terrorism and the terrorists themselves. Existing strainbased approaches put too much of an emphasis on the strains themselves, without addressing the
reasons that terrorism is committed (Jalata, 2010). Building on that criticism, he and other
scholars believe that collective strains are multifaceted in their nature and their effectiveness and
that many general strain theorists apply the concept of strain too simply by saying that strain
causes terrorism, but they do not consider what that means or what it can look like. For example,
in his approach to applying General Strain Theory to terrorism, Jalata (2010) provides detailed
examples of collective grievances that can lead to terrorism, including oppressive and
exploitative policies of state elites, the refusal to address longstanding grievances peacefully and
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fairly, the development of extreme ideologies, and the emotions of the aggrieved populations.
Furthermore, these strains can be broken down into other strains that involve national, religious,
or cultural oppression, economic exploitation, political repression, human rights violations,
attacks on life and liberty, state terrorism, and other forms of social injustice (Jalata, 2010).
Analyzing collective strains in this context is important to understanding terrorism because these
strains are the factors that are most likely to increase the potential for terrorism.

Rational Choice Theory
Rational Choice Theory is typically used as an economic theory to explain the costs and
benefits of a particular action; however, criminologists, such as Derek B. Cornish and Richard V.
Clarke (1986) also use the theory to explain why an individual is likely to choose criminal, over
noncriminal, behavior. The main premise of Rational Choice Theory assumes that individuals are
rational and that self-interested human beings will be affected by the consequences of their
actions. This assumption implies that criminal behavior is not different from noncriminal
behavior because the individual consciously and intentionally chooses to partake in criminal or
noncriminal activity. When individuals decide to engage in criminal activity, it is because they
have decided that this behavior will have more benefits and fewer costs than law-abiding
behavior (Rational Choice Theory). Rational Choice Theory is all about an individual's choice to
do something. Individuals will commit a crime because they chose to do it, not because an
outside force is compelling them to resort to deviancy. The logic behind the theory is that an
offender will rationally choose to commit a crime because it is in their best interest, and they will
assess their action based on the assumption that it will satisfy their needs on a higher level than
noncriminal behavior.
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Many theories of criminality rely on the premise that legal behavior is determined by
biological, psychological, or environmental factors that compel an individual to commit a crime.
However, Rational Choice Theory argues the opposite. Rational Choice Theory argues that
people voluntarily and willfully choose to commit criminal acts and that all forms of crime result
from an individual consciously making the choice to engage in criminal activity. Before making
this decision, the individual will weigh the costs and benefits of their participation in criminal
behavior, while also weighing the costs and benefits of alternative legal behavior, to decide on
what is in their best interest (Rational Choice Theory). When an individual concludes that the
crime will be more rewarding than costly, when compared to alternative actions, they will choose
to engage in crime because they believe it is in their best interest to do so.
Although this theory assumes that individuals will rationally weigh the costs and benefits
associated with their actions, it does not presume that people will always be perfectly rational in
their decision-making process (Rational Choice Theory). No one is always going to make a
rational decision when deciding on a course of action. Individuals will sometimes take shortcuts
in collecting information on the best course of action, they may base their decision on
misinformation, or they may simply weigh each factor incorrectly. Despite these shortcomings of
rationality, an individual’s decision process is still based on them rationally deciding what is in
their best interest, given the information that they possess. Every individual is different, which is
important to consider because it means that everyone will weigh the costs and benefits of a
particular action based on their understanding of what is beneficial or costly to them. In other
words, the analysis of costs and benefits is subjective and varies from person to person. What
one individual deems rational, another might view as irrational.
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Rational Choice Theory assumes that an individual decides to engage in criminal or
noncriminal behavior, they go through a decision making process in which they weigh all of the
perceived costs and benefits of their actions. Some of the perceived costs associated with
engaging in various types of criminal behavior include the certainty of formal sanctions, the
severity of formal sanctions, informal certainty of punishment, informal severity of punishment,
and the experience of negative emotions such as shame or guilt (Rational Choice Theory). The
benefits of crime are fewer. The benefits include how much pleasure or happiness can be derived
from their actions if it will increase their levels of self-esteem, and if they will gain the approval,
respect, and notoriety for their peers (Rational Choice Theory). As previously mentioned the
costs and benefits of criminal behavior will have different valuations based on the individual’s
perceptions, so each individual will likely attribute different value to the costs and benefits
mentioned above.
Rational Choice Theory would indicate that individual offenders are rational enough to
calculate the costs and benefits of both criminal behavior and conventional behavior. Individuals
will generally choose the behavior that provides them with greater rewards at the least costs.
They will rationally think through all of the perceived costs and benefits associated with their
actions before they decide to commit a crime, or abstain from criminal behavior. The behavior
that will grant the individual with the best outcome, typically in the shortest amount of time, is
normally what will be chosen.

Rational Choice Theory Applied to Terrorism
Cornish and Clarke’s (1986) Rational Choice Theory is also applicable to the study of
terrorism. Rational Choice Theory posits that human beings are capable of reasoning and
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weighing the costs and benefits of their actions to make a rational choice of whether or not that
action is a good idea. This can readily be applied to the study of terrorism because so many
people believe that terrorists are irrational human beings that are simply incapable of rational
thought. However, Rational Choice Theory applies to commonly cited reasons for terrorism to
show that terrorists are, for the most part, rational individuals. This is shown through an analysis
of the fact that the vast majority of terrorists are not willing to risk their lives for their cause,
which is why so few of them engage in tactics, such as suicide bombings. The news frequently
discusses suicide bombings, which would suggest that they occur often, but in reality, that is not
the case. There is no disputing the fact that terrorists are dedicated to their cause, but the vast
majority of them will refuse to make significant voluntary sacrifices to their cause, such as
participating in suicide tactics (Caplan, 2006). Terrorists will weigh the costs and benefits to
conclude that they want to live, and they do not want to sacrifice everything for the cause.
Since Rational Choice Theory emphasizes the weighing of costs and benefits, it has been
a theory adopted by economists and criminologists alike to explain many aspects of human
behavior. In recent years, scholars such as Bray (2009) and Caplan (2006) have begun to adapt
the theory of rational choice to apply to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. Bray (2009)
believes that using a strictly economic interpretation of terrorism can be essential to
policymakers in drafting counterterrorism policies because the theory can help policymakers
visualize and understand what types of decisions that terrorists will make based on the costs and
benefits that a terrorist is typically presented with (Bray, 2009). He also emphasized that
although terrorists may appear to be irrational actors, they are rational human beings. They are
rational human beings because, under Rational Choice Theory, the assumption is that individuals
will behave in ways that attempt to maximize their well being per the constraints of their present
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conditions while minimizing the costs of their actions (Bray, 2009). This assumption about
human behavior is not only helpful in understanding terrorism itself, but also in helping
policymakers draft policies, given that it allows them to assume that individuals will act in a
predictable manner that is consistent with their preferences to maximize benefits and minimize
costs. Caplan (2006) also emphasizes this fundamental point that Rational Choice Theory shows
that terrorists are actionably rational actors who simply engage in activities that appear as
irrational to outsiders. Building on the assumption of Rational Choice Theory, Caplan (2006)
focused on three different senses of rationality that include a terrorist’s unresponsiveness to
incentives, deviation from self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. Much of the
terrorism literature suggests that terrorists are irrational, but based on these three senses of
rationality, Caplan (2006) believes that terrorists are rational, based on how they approach the
circumstances of their life. An example of terrorists being rational is the fact that they rationally
respond to incentives.
They will often sit on the sidelines if costs of participation are high, but once these costs
decrease and they could accomplish their goals with little to no risk to themselves, they would
actively engage in terrorist activity (Caplan, 2006). Terrorists will not assume high risks for their
own sake since they are still human beings and the will to live wins out over the will to injure
themselves or die for the cause. Of course, this is disproven by suicide bombers, but suicide
bombers only make up a small proportion of terrorist activities. Terrorists will only engage in
risky and dangerous tactics when they are the most effective option to accomplish their agenda.
The motivations behind violent acts of terrorism are so hard for those outside of the organization
to understand, but that does not mean that terrorists are irrational in their choices. They weigh
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their actions and decisions on the path that will lead them to the best outcome, indicating that
they are rational actors engaging in a rational thought process.
Besides showing that terrorists are rational actors, Rational Choice Theory can readily be
applied to counterterrorism strategies. By assuming that terrorists are rational actors who will
weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, developing counterterrorism strategies that will
raise the costs of engaging in unwanted behavior has the potential to decrease the likelihood of
an attack. Raising the costs of engaging in terrorism through increasing the potential for
punishment is believed to reduce the overall benefit or utility of terrorism, and therefore reduce
the likelihood of a violent attack. Furthermore, raising the expected utility of abstaining from
terrorism in the first place is also believed to be an effective strategy to counter the threat of
terrorism (Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012). Relying on the logic of Rational Choice Theory by
developing counterterrorism policies by raising the costs of terrorism by increasing the
likelihood of punishment, and rewarding individuals who could decide to engage in terrorism for
abstaining from terror could effectively decrease the amount of terroristic activity present in a
community. Keeping the considerations of the Rational Choice Theory in mind when trying to
understand terrorism and develop counterterrorism policies would be very beneficial because
although we may not see a decision to engage in terrorism as rational, terrorists are still making
rational decisions given their own experiences.

Limitations
Currently, there are few theoretical answers in terrorism literature that explains what
leads some terrorists to act violently while others do not engage in any type of violent terrorist
activities. Although General Strain Theory and Rational Choice Theory provide a good basis for
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an explanation of terrorism these theories have theoretical and empirical limitations. For
example, both theories have mixed empirical support in their effects on criminal behavior.
Various aspects of General Strain Theory have been empirically tested, and although many of
these tests have supported the assumptions of the theory, more tests will need to be conducted to
truly provide evidence for the assumptions of General Strain Theory and their influence on
criminal behavior, especially in regards to terrorism (Kayaoglu, 2008). The same is true for
Rational Choice Theory. Since Rational Choice Theory is not only a criminological theory but an
economic theory as well, many aspects that can directly be applied to criminal behavior need to
be explored in further detail. Many analyses of Rational Choice Theory have strictly focused on
the economic aspects of the theory instead of on the behavioral aspects that can explain an
individual’s choice to engage in criminal behavior. There is also the fact that criminological
theories that believe individuals are rational actors do not take into consideration the issue of
individual preferences that can be aggregated into a group decision, how information flows
within the group, or how individual group members come to a consensus about their behavior
(Enders & Su, 2007).
Another limitation of applying these two theories to the study of terrorism is that neither
theory takes into consideration the role of outside factors in influencing an individual’s decision
to engage in crime, such as delinquent peers. These theories take into consideration internal and
external factors that affect the likelihood of an individual engaging in terroristic activity, but they
do not discuss the role that like-minded peer groups play in fostering conditions for terrorism to
take place. It simply discusses that when an individual is experiencing strain that the appeal of
delinquent peer groups increases, but it does not go into detail on the key role that likeminded,
delinquent peer groups can play in increasing the likelihood of an individual resorting to violent
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extremism to alleviate the stress they are experiencing. Using these two theories to explain
terrorism would be stronger if they considered more elements that are influential in creating an
environment that is conducive for terrorism to take place.

Other Theories that can Apply to Terrorism
In addition to General Strain Theory and Rational Choice Theory, other theories have
been posited to explain the complex phenomenon of terrorism. However, these theories have not
been as rigorously applied to the topic of terrorism as the two focal points of this paper, but they
are still worth mentioning. Donald Black (2004) applied the theory of social control to terrorism.
He argued that terrorism is a form of “unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly
inflict mass violence on other civilians” (Black, 2004, p. 10) and that terrorism itself is a
distinctive form of social control. He believes that terrorism is a form of social control because it
defines and responds to deviant behavior. Terrorism acts as a form of self-help by providing
individuals with a method to handle their grievances. He relates the violence employed by
terrorists to lesser forms of criminal activity, such as assaults and homicides, which are equally
as violent as terrorism itself and which similarly resist or punish someone’s conduct for being
morally wrong (Black, 2004).
The main premise of Black’s (2004) theory of terrorism as social control seems to be that
terrorism itself is a form of social control in that it provides terrorists with a way to control the
civilian population in their home country to get them to do what they want and further their
political and religious agenda. Terrorists define their enemies as deviants who need to be stopped
by employing their idea of justice, which in their eyes is terrorism. The theory of social control
kind of relates to Rational Choice Theory in that terrorists is choosing to engage in terrorism
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because they think it is the most beneficial course of action for themselves and their
organization. Social control theory provides a unique way to look at the concept of terrorism and
should be explored further, but at this time not many scholars have taken a social control
approach to terrorism.

Conclusion
Policymakers, the media, and the public are constantly looking for an explanation for
terrorism. Applying criminological theories, such as General Strain Theory and Rational Choice
Theory, provides a potential explanation for the causes and motivations behind an individual’s
decision to engage in terrorism. Using criminological theory as a basis for explaining terrorism is
a good starting point for understanding this complex topic, but more research, testing, and
evaluations of the merits of this approach must be conducted.
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Social Media: Friend or Foe to National Security?
Working Paper Two – Capstone
Rhianna Hayes
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Introduction
The age of the Internet has brought about many amazing things. It has bridged the gap
between nations by allowing us to form interconnected communities with people from all over
the world, it has allowed us access to an abundance of knowledge at the click of a button, and it
has allowed us to share our opinions with like-minded individuals from different countries across
various social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. Although the Internet has opened
the door to create a more friendly and connected community, it has also opened the door for
more nefarious actions through the powerful influence of social media.

The Power of Social Media
Social media has had a profound impact on our daily lives. Most people throughout the
world, and especially in the United States, consume vast amounts of information from various
media outlets each day. These media outlets have the potential to be very powerful because they
influence the way information is presented to the public. The topics that are most often covered
and sensationalized by the media are the topics of war and terrorism. Throughout history, these
topics have been emphasized in the media, but since 9/11 there has been a rise in media coverage
on the topic of terrorism, along with the United States’ self-declared War on Terror. With
improvements in technology over the years, media coverage of terrorism has become even more
sensationalized through the increased coverage of events in the form of gruesome images and
video clips of the devastating effects that war and terror have on a variety of populations
throughout the world (Tulloch & Blood, 2012). These images have greatly impacted our
perception of war and terrorism. Our perceptions of war and terrorism are further influenced by
the media’s constant overage on these topics. This constant coverage creates a sense of perpetual
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war, which increases fear and concerns over terrorism among the public. When images of war
and terrorism are always in the media, the public believes that war and acts of terrorism are
constantly occurring, even if that is not necessarily true.
The media has the power to shape public opinion on certain topics, but they are also
capable of promoting fear and anxiety throughout the general public. In today’s society, the
majority of people consume their news through television, the Internet, and social media. When a
terrorist attack has occurred, it can be immediately broadcasted on live TV, live-streamed on
Facebook or Instagram, and shared across various other sources throughout the Internet. This
dissemination of the attack benefits the media because they will be able to turn a profit from the
number of views they receive, but it also benefits the terrorist organizations themselves who
were behind the attack because it gets their agenda out to a larger audience.
A symbiotic relationship exists between the media and terrorist organizations because
both groups benefit from media coverage. The world needs to be informed of terrorist activities,
but media sources and the public should be informed of the fact that constant coverage of the
attacks benefits the terrorist organizations as well. Terrorist organizations are benefitted by
media exposure because one of their main objectives is to publicize their political agenda and
explain their rationale for resorting to acts of violence (Marin, 2009). The media is the perfect
tool for them to use to accomplish this goal, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, is
one such organization that takes advantage of social media platforms for darker purposes that are
a direct threat to national security.

ISIS and the Internet
ISIS is an infamous terrorist organization that poses a major threat to international
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security. ISIS is known for its brutal terror tactics and targeting of innocent civilians. In recent
years, these terrorists have expanded their combatant ranks thereby commanding the attention of
governments, media, and the general public. ISIS remains spotlighted through social media,
which allows them to spread propaganda, recruit new members, and spread fear as it seeks to
establish an entirely new Islamic Caliphate under Sharia law (Clarke, 2004).
ISIS has mastered using social media platforms to their advantage. They are the most
technologically savvy terrorist organization, partially because they are the “first terrorist group
whose members have grown up on the Internet”, giving them the skills to be proficient at using
technology to communicate and organize with one another, while also allowing them to use
social media to spread fear, radicalize, and recruit the general public throughout the world
(Corera, 2015, p. 379). The Internet has connected people all over the world with one another,
and although this has been beneficial for societies all around the world, this interconnectedness
has also been detrimental. Globalization in the age of the Internet may have been intended for
good, but it is now being used for evil since it acts as “command central” for terrorist
organizations, such as ISIS, to communicate, plot, recruit, address sympathizers and enemies,
and to claim responsibility for terrorist acts committed by their members (Becker, 2005). ISIS
has the skills, and social media provides forums through which its evil intentions are having
disastrous impacts throughout the world.
As previously mentioned, ISIS is one of the most technologically capable terrorist
organizations in existence. In fact, ISIS is so technologically skilled that some counterterrorism
experts have referred to the Internet as a “terrorist university,” in which ISIS members can learn
new techniques and skills to improve upon their recruitment strategies, dissemination of
propaganda, and notoriety (Goodman, 2015, p. 29). ISIS is no longer only a brutal fighting force,
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but a media conglomerate as well that is capable of releasing thirty-eight new media items per
day through the use of social media websites and apps. These media items include full-length
documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, and pamphlets, in languages ranging from Russia to
Bengali to English (Koerner, 2017). This content is used to recruit new members and spread
propaganda by convincing prospective recruits that ISIS is a stable empire that is inexorably
growing, and therefore they should enlist in their fight against the Western World. So far, their
digital recruitment efforts have motivated more than 30,000 individuals to leave everything
they’ve ever known and journey thousands of miles to join ISIS in the countries they occupy
(Koerner, 2017) What makes ISIS’ social media campaign even stronger and more threatening is
the fact that they capitalize on an influx of foreign recruits by releasing propaganda videos that
feature foreign fighters who speak Western languages, and who encourage more Westerners to
join the cause and wage violent jihad against infidels or take part in the Islamic caliphate in some
other way. Another tactic employed by ISIS is to use women to lure recruits by having them post
on Twitter, Tumblr, and other social media platforms about how amazing their lives are and how
they are fighting for a just cause in the name of Islam (Engel, 2015). They are master
manipulators of the Internet and their target audience.
ISIS has been able to recruit many individuals through their extensive media campaign
that paints their organization in a positive light and consistently gains them notoriety among likeminded terrorist organizations. This is done over various social media platforms, including
Tweets and Facebook posts promoting good works and charitable donations that members have
participated in, and YouTube videos that show members working to improve the appearance of
their communities, and handing out ice cream to children (Larzelere, 2015). The purpose of these
posts and videos is to show that ISIS is helping local communities in the Middle East and trying
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to improve the way of life for their people. However, not all of the videos show them as friendly,
helpful, individuals. Videos also depict graphic beheadings and ISIS members making their
victims dig their own graves (Larzelere, 2015).
One of the more problematic aspects of ISIS recruitment strategies is their targeting of
disaffected youth all over the world. Through practices that have become known as “Jihadi
Cool”, ISIS has begun to specifically target younger generations by promoting how “cool” and
powerful you can become by becoming a member of ISIS. ISIS members will pose in their
military-style uniforms, with their flag and weapons in the background, attempting to look as
strong as possible, to target disaffected millennial’s who are unhappy with their place in society.
These images and videos attempt to display the idea that “one is never too young to be a warrior
for God” (“‘Jihadi Cool’: How ISIS Switched Its Recruitment…”). ISIS has become very
effective at targeting disaffected youth because their propaganda tactics are very persuasive.
Besides claiming that one is never too young to become a warrior for God, they also have
media that claims that ISIS is their brother in Islam, and if they join them in their cause, that they
will have a family and a support system that will love and provide for them (“Jihadi Cool”: How
ISIS Switched Its Recruitment…”). By promoting the idea of family and a support system, ISIS
has gained many young recruits who have not found their place in the world and who are looking
for any way to fit in and create a family of their own. Ultimately, the aim of propaganda
strategies used by ISIS for recruitment is to win the hearts and minds of their target audience,
while maintaining the appeal of the organization for youth (Awan, 2017). They claim that they
want to provide individuals with a family, and an outlet for their religious frustration at nonMuslims and this can be a very powerful motivating force for youth who feel as if they don’t
belong. The fact that ISIS is so adept at using social media makes its recruitment of young,
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idealistic, disaffected, youth even more powerful since so many people under the age of thirty
are glued to their phones or laptops.
ISIS poses a three-dimensional threat to the world. They are no longer only a threat on
the ground, but also a threat through our screens. They have mastered the use of technology to
their advantage, and the detriment of society as a whole. In the hands of ISIS, social media and
the Internet have most certainly become a foe to national security. Addressing this foe is
extremely difficult because the Internet is such a complex battlefield. ISIS has millions of
websites that they can spread information on, and plenty of encrypted apps that they
communicate through without being discovered by government agencies. Government agencies
are constantly monitoring the Web for terroristic content, but they cannot keep up with the neverending flow of propaganda that ISIS produces. This means that more effective technology needs
to be developed to aid government agencies in stopping the proliferation of ISIS propaganda
throughout the world.

Counterterrorism Efforts and Social Media
ISIS has capitalized on the idea that “radicalization occurs not in mosques, but rather
online, in secret”, which makes combating the threat of terrorism in cyberspace even more
difficult” (Blaker, 2015, p. 4). Combatting terrorism in the online world is incredibly difficult,
but governments have worked to develop effective counterterrorism strategies to mitigate the
threat online. However, these policies have met with varying degrees of success. One of the more
widely used online counterterrorism effort is for government agencies to limit what information
is available to the public by examining the content on various websites, and then censoring, or
taking down the website, if it is promoting terroristic content. At first glance, this appears to be
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an easy and simple solution to the terrorist threat online. However, the United States government
has been hopelessly outgunned in its battle against ISIS propaganda online, due to the sheer
volume of propaganda that is spread throughout the Internet on a daily basis (Patrikarakos,
2017).
The growing online presence and support for ISIS have further overwhelmed the law
enforcement agency's abilities to effectively monitor extremist activities online. This has forced
government agencies to only focus on online activities that they perceive are the most severe
security cases (Speckhard, Shajkovci, & Yala). This is a very subjective approach to
counterterrorism which becomes problematic because it leaves room for many cases that were
initially perceived as minor to potentially blow up into a major threat, and if the agencies had
more manpower they would have been able to prevent it. Governments have no generally known
capability to actively monitor massive amounts of Web content sufficiently (Kaplan, 2009). In
other words, they have methods to monitor massive amounts of data from the Internet, but these
methods are not unclassified, and so are not public knowledge.
Thanks to the government files leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013, we know that the
National Security Agency (NSA) was conducting mass surveillance on the American public to
look for terrorist threats. This suggests that the NSA is capable of actively monitoring massive
amounts of content to search for clues of impending terrorism, but despite their capabilities, it is
now illegal for government agencies to collect data on the entire American population for spying
purposes. In their spying operations, the NSA actively violated the Fourth Amendment, Title III,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA). The Fourth Amendment guarantees that America’s privacy may not be invaded
without a warrant based on probable cause, and Title III, ECPA, and FISA are the only laws that
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authorize any exceptions to the ban on the authorization of electronic eavesdropping by the
government “NSA Spying on Americans is Illegal”).
The NSA spying operations were not authorized by any of these Amendments or laws,
making their actions illegal, and the information obtained through these operations inadmissible
for indictment purposes. The secret collection of information from everyone in the population
raised many ethical concerns because of the illegality of the violation of American’s right to
privacy. The NSA’s attempt to combat terrorism through data mining is only one solution that
ultimately failed to stop the threat posed by terrorism. Many solutions have been proposed and
implemented, but attempts to stop the spread of terroristic viewpoints online have failed so far.
By exploring other methods that could potentially be more effective in solving this problem, we
might be able to lessen the effect that ISIS has on social media platforms.

Innovation and Advancement in Cyberterrorism Strategies
Counterterrorism officials have been completely stumped by the sophisticated
propaganda machine that ISIS has become in developing their global communication strategy for
recruitment and the dissemination of information about their cause (Sanchez, 2015). This has
created the need for counterterrorism officials to develop more innovative approaches in addition
to the current counterterrorism strategies. So far these new approaches have met with varying
degrees of success, however, these approaches are worth mentioning and exploring further.
One innovative approach to counterterrorism strategies is based on the fact that ISIS’ use
of social media poses a borderless, technological thereat, which requires the criminal justice
system to have at least a basic knowledge in the language of science and technology. Since this
threat is borderless and takes place all over the world through the interconnectedness of the
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Internet, it only makes sense that online counterterrorism efforts should be handled through an
international response (Goodman, 2015). Social media platforms are considered to be
transnational by nature, so one innovative solution that has been proposed to combat the threat of
ISIS online is to develop a global response to cyberterrorism. This could be done through the
United Nations, or another international body, working to agree upon a series of strict guidelines
that would determine what material is prohibited across social media platforms (Patrikarakos,
2017). If the international community united to develop guidelines on what is appropriate to post
online, that would lessen the burden on each nation that is monitoring, deleting, censoring, and
blocking terroristic content. If the United States wasn’t solely responsible for monitoring the
content on social media, and other nations joined them or increased their own efforts, in the
battle against extremist media online, the levels of ISIS propaganda would most likely decrease.
However, as of the time of writing this, no such international effort has been explored or
implemented in the fight against ISIS in cyberspace. It remains a theoretical possibility.
Although the idea of an international collaboration to prevent cyberterrorism has failed to
gain momentum as a policy, other creative solutions have been proposed. One such solution is to
create phony terrorist websites. These websites can be used to spread disinformation ranging
from instructions for building a bomb that will explode prematurely, to false intelligence about
the location of United States forces in Iraq, which would lead terrorist fighters into a trap
(Kaplan, 2009). If a terrorist, or potential terrorist, come across these websites, it is assumed that
they will follow the instructions that the government created. Even if they do not follow these
instructions, the fact that fake terrorist websites are popping up online will fill up the searches for
legitimate websites, and make it harder for terrorists to discover the legitimate terrorist websites.
Following the same logic of inundating the Internet with non-terrorist websites, some
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officials have proposed that Western nations take a page from the terrorist book and foster their
own forms of crowdsourced messages online. This can be done through a Western focus on
broadcasting refugee stories that are told in their own words and their native language, which
would undermine the narrative that is so crucial to the identity of ISIS (Koerner, 2017). These
counter messages would serve a dual purpose. They would serve their intended purpose of
undermining the rhetoric of ISSI, but they would also show that not all practitioners of Islam are
terrorists and that in many cases, innocent civilians have to fight for their lives against terrorist
regimes like ISIS. However, simply producing more counter propaganda and counter-narratives
will not solve the ISIS problem.

Government and Social Media Approaches to Cyberterrorism
Although the previously mentioned actions taken by the NSA were illegal, most law
enforcement and government agencies keep circling back to the idea of data mining and
monitoring mass amounts of information as the most effective solution to countering ISIS
propaganda online. No method has appeared to be the most successful at countering online
terrorism, but it appears that data mining and monitoring might be the most effective solution
that has been thoroughly explored and implemented. That being said, if this is, in fact, the most
effective method, it must be implemented on a smaller scale and through legal channels. For this
to work legally, social media websites will have to do a better job of self-censoring inappropriate
content that is posted to their websites, instead of relying on the government to do all of the work
for them. They must take the initiative into their own hands, while also cooperating with
government agencies whenever necessary.
One of the most proactive social media websites in regards to stopping the ISIS
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propaganda has been Twitter. They have actively worked to take down official ISIS profiles, but
they have done little to stop the large influx of tweets containing ISIS support and propaganda
(Larzelere, 2015). This is a step in the right direction, but social media websites need to pursue
more effective methods to accomplish even more. It is a losing battle to shut down every single
Twitter, Facebook, or other social media account because more will continue to pop up and the
problem won’t be solved, but shutting down accounts is a step that needs to be taken. Some
officials have proposed that there needs to be an overhaul in the user guidelines and policies of
social media websites to make it nearly impossible for groups to spread hate and terror across
online platforms (Larzelere, 2015). These guidelines need to be changed sooner rather than later,
and this change would affect the average user as well, which is why some people are concerned
about implementing this type of change. Any policy that would affect the general public is likely
to spark outrage over policy concerns, which would make it hard for such a policy to effectively
do its job.
In addition to specific guidelines being implemented by social media outlets themselves,
many policymakers have begun to advocate for the government to draft clear legislation on what
is impermissible on social media platforms. To enforce this implementation, individuals would
be fined heavily and face public censure if they refuse to comply (Patrikarakos, 2017). Creating
and implementing legislation like this has the potential to make strides in decreasing the Islamic
State’s use of social media online, but it will be difficult to implement the fines and public
censure if there are not enough people to monitor the massive amount of social media accounts.
If there are not enough resources to enable enough people to monitor social media sites, then
there will not be enough people who are capable of fining those who violate the legislation. The
groundwork has been laid for effective policy, but the finer details need to be ironed out a bit
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more before the policy has any hope of being successful.

Conclusion
The age of the Internet has brought about unprecedented threats to national security. It
has been a useful tool in connecting the international community, but it has also allowed for the
dissemination of hateful and threatening content throughout the world. It has created an online
space in which tech-savvy terrorist organizations, like ISIS, can spread their messages and
recruit more people to join their cause, and because of the complex nature of the Internet, these
messages are difficult to eradicate. Cyberterrorism policies have been created and implemented
to mitigate the harmful effects of terrorist organizations, but these policies have met with varying
degrees of success. Until more effective strategies are developed and implemented, social media
and the Internet will continue to be a foe to national security around the world when it is
employed by terrorist organizations, such as ISIS.
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Introduction
Terrorism and counterterrorism are topics that have many layers, which makes
conducting an analysis very difficult. One of the layers of terrorism and counterterrorism is the
role that perception plays in how we view these topics. Perceptions are powerful because they
shape how we view our lives, and this extends to how we view policies that affect our lives as
well. Thus, it is likely that perceptions play a powerful role in how we create and implement
policies to deal with the major threat posed by terrorism. It is important to analyze the role of
perceptions in counterterrorism strategies because perceptions of terrorism influence the wider
narrative on terrorism itself, and this has a profound impact on counterterrorism policies that are
created and implemented within the United States and abroad.
Terrorism has been a threat to national and international security throughout history, but
it was not associated with any one group of people until approximately the 1980s. In the 1980s,
Muslim groups began to be associated with the word terrorist, and by the middle of the 1990s,
“racialized stereotypes that held that all terrorists just be Middle Easterners because so
pervasive” that when the attack on the Federal Building in Oklahoma City took place “…many
professional analysts, investigators, and journalists immediately assumed that the attacks were
carried out by ‘Arabs’” (Love, 2009, p. 411). This association between terrorism and Middle
Easterners only grew stronger after the events that took place on September 11, 2001.
The emphasis by politicians on the dangers of terrorism in the post 9/11 years has also led
the public to perceive the risk of terrorism in different ways over time. The fact that terrorism is
frequently highlighted in the news has also led to an increased belief in terrorism as a threat by
the public, which can have direct policy implications. The media plays a major role in framing
public discourse about a variety of topics and when it comes to Islam and terrorism, it is no
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different. When terrorism is concerned, the media coverage of events will typically be dominated
by messages of fear, anger, and revenge, which directly affects how the public view the
perpetrators of an attack, and the attack itself (Ogan, Willnat, Pennington, & Bashir, 2013).
Portraying coverage of events in this way will lead the public to believe that Islam is a severe
threat to national, and international security. This creates a heightened sense of risk for being
attacked by a terrorist organization, which in turn triggers support for more punitive
counterterrorism strategies (Liu, Mumpower, Portney & Vedlitz, 2019).
People view terrorism in a variety of different ways, based on their personal experiences,
the information they are exposed to, and the type of media they consume. All of these factors can
change how policymakers view the problem of terrorism when creating policy and how the
public reacts to the implementation of counterterrorism policies. It is important to examine the
role that the perception of terrorism plays in influencing counterterrorism policy creation and
implementation because we must be aware of what influences these types of policies.
Perceptions are biases, and if policies are being created and implemented based on internalized
biases about a specific group of people or a specific topic, it can lead to problematic policies that
are detrimental not only to the affected groups but to society as a whole.

Perceptions and Terrorism
Perceptions play a huge role in the field of criminal justice. This is because perceptions
influence how a topic is viewed and defined by law enforcement agencies, policymakers, and the
public. Everyone has their own perception that is based on their own internal biases and
preconceived notions about their opinion on a certain topic. Perceptions of terrorism and
counterterrorism policies are no different. Even if these individuals do not have a strong opinion
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on terrorism, most individuals will have some kind of idea of what a terrorist looks like and acts
like, and on many occasions, the people most commonly associated with terrorism are Muslims
and Middle Easterners. Many people do not realize, that as with many crimes, terrorists can look
and act like anyone. However, because of these preconceived notions of who a terrorist is, we
can observe how these notions influence how terrorism is viewed, and how counterterrorism
strategies are created. Preconceived notions about terrorism are very problematic and are often
based on racist biases and stereotypes. This is shown through the fact that when many people
hear the word terrorism, their next thought most likely jumps to the word “Muslim”, “Middle
Eastern”, or “Islam”.

Islamophobia
Many individuals hold widely prejudicial opinions against Muslims and Middle
Easterners because of the horrific event that took place on September 11th, 2001. This
association between terrorism and Islam has led to the development of what is known as
“Islamophobia”. Like terrorism itself, the term Islamophobia has many different meanings, but
they all share a commonality in their definitions. This commonality is the fact that all definitions
emphasize that Islamophobia is discrimination targeted against Muslim, or Muslim looking,
individuals. Considine (2017) states that Islamophobia is the “radicalization of American
Muslims [that] generates local and palpable experiences of exclusion and abuse for both
Muslims and non-Muslims”, and he later goes on to say that “it is merely the figment of a
paranoid or politically motivated imagination, or constructed out of a desire to perpetuate a siege
mentality and sense of victimhood against Muslims” (Considine, 2017, p. 1). Similarly, Love
(2009) emphasizes that Islamophobia is “the most common term used to refer to bigotry,
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discrimination, policies, and practices directed towards Islam and a radicalized group of people
that includes Muslims (Love, 2009, p. 402).
Other scholars have taken a more political approach in defining Islamophobia. Fahmy
(2005) discusses Islamophobia in the context of McCarthyism. She describes Islamophobia as a
cultural and political discourse “that is far more reaching and socially destructive than the
McCarthyism of the 1950’s” (Fahmy, 2015, p. 1). McCarthyism provides a helpful metaphor for
the consequences of Islamophobia because each form of discrimination has detrimentally
affected a specific group of people throughout different parts of history. McCarthyism and
Islamophobia both lead to the exclusion of a certain group of people from the perceived nation
and the perceived national identity. This exclusion is often perpetuated and facilitated by the
dominant groups in society to keep the targeted group subservient. This exclusion of the target
group is facilitated through the culture of surveillance that exists within the United States and has
only increased in the wake of 9/11 (Fahmy, 2015). Yazdiha (2014) provides another political
definition of Islamophobia. She describes Islamophobia as a “strategic movement led by a small,
tightly networked group of misinformation experts that institutionalizes fear and suspicion of
Islam through bills and ballot initiatives” (Yazdiha, 2014, p. 267). These definitions of
Islamophobia are the most commonly discussed in the literature and were worth mentioning.
They all vary to a certain degree, but what they have in common is the emphasis on
discrimination against Muslims and Muslim looking individuals.

Islamophobia Promoted through the Media
Media and news sources play a powerful role in framing and promoting Islamophobia
within the United States and abroad. This is because coverage of incidents involving or
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concerning Muslims or Muslim countries is almost always negative. When covering a story, the
media has the power to choose how they are going to present the information. When stories
concern Muslim individuals, media outlets tend to resort to stereotypical interpretations. Many
analyses have been conducted on the influence that the media has played in the portrayal of
Muslims, and how that influences public perception, which in turn influences public policy. One
such analysis was conducted by Ogan, et al. (2013) to examine how the media frames the public
discourse on Muslims and Islam throughout Europe and the United States. In their study, they
found that media exposure to Muslim-related issues has an impact on attitudes toward Muslims
and Islam in general, especially when that exposure is negative. These authors also found that
negative attitudes toward Muslims and Islam are most strongly associated with political
conservatism and that Republicans are far more likely to be exposed to conservative media
surrounding Muslims and Islam (Ogan, et al., 2013). The findings of this study are consistent
with the existing literature examining media exposure and pre-existing beliefs.
Another important aspect of the study conducted by Ogan et al (2013) is the fact that the
results emphasized the idea behind confirmation bias. Confirmation bias exists when someone
has a preconceived notion, and they look to media that hold their same beliefs to confirm that
their belief is right or accurate. When it comes to Islamophobia and the media, Islamophobic
content is consistently promoted by more conservative news sources, such as Fox News, and
republicans and conservatives will readily turn to this news source to reinforce their existing
attitudes towards Muslims. This essentially creates a never-ending cycle of promoting and
confirming Islamophobic attitudes in the media and among the public. Besides news sources, it is
also important to look at how social media and entertainment representations of Islam are key
factors that contribute to the increase of Islamophobia throughout the country. For example, the
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fact that in many forms of entertainment, Arabs and Muslims are consistently used as heinous
villains, which shows how the public perceptions of Arabs and Muslims can be shaped and
skewed by what they are seeing (Considine, 2017). This is yet another example of confirmation
bias, since many Americans already view these groups as villains, making them villains in
popular media and entertainment only reinforces this idea.

Policy Implications
The development of specialized discrimination in the form of Islamophobia has farreaching policy implications, especially in the United States. The United States has a racially
charged history, and to this day, we are still dealing with racist ideologies in our civilian and
political lives. Where terrorism is concerned, Islamophobia acts as the anti-Muslim tool to
stimulate cultural discomfort into politically actionable resources of fear and power.
Islamophobia is capable of doing this because of the political climate that exists within the
United States. Islamophobia is an ideology that strongly resonates with what has been referred to
as a “growing cultural vocabulary, and underlying racist principles that are widely accepted as
distinctly and uniquely American” (Yazdiha, 2014, p. 270). This vocabulary and underlying
racist principles have only increased within recent years under the Trump Administration.
Reviewing polls from 2017 has shown that a vast majority of non-Muslims in the United States
have become increasingly hostile towards Muslims and Middle Easterners. This increase in
hostility has directly paralleled the developing Islamophobic discourse that is readily employed
by politicians and media outlets (Considine, 2017). The fact that politicians and media outlets are
so eager to employ anti-Muslim rhetoric has major policy implications for counterterrorism
strategies.
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This rhetoric employed by Islamophobia has led to the creation of counterterrorism
policies that reinforce stereotypes of Muslim individuals and that specifically target this group of
people. After 9/11, people began to see terrorism through an Islamophobic, anti-Muslim, lens.
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center were perpetrated by Muslim individuals, people
began to associate Muslims with terrorism. This is because, for many individuals, the attacks of
9/11 were the first exposure they had to terrorism, meaning that all other incidents would be
shaped by their perception of the first attack that they experienced. This way of thinking led
directly to policies like the Patriot Act being created and implemented. These policies were all
created with security and protection for American citizens in mind, but they didn’t consider how
they would affect Muslim Americans and Muslim looking Americans. No one stopped to
consider how their perception of terrorism was influencing their perceptions of individuals who
had nothing to do with terrorism, but simply looked like or practiced the same religion as the
perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11.
When it comes to framing the topic of terrorism, politicians and the media have immense
power and will use that power to convince people to see their point of view. The words these
groups use matter. As Deborah Stone (2002) notes, “…words, as we know, are loaded. The mere
act of naming something places it in a class and suggests that it is like some things and unlike
others” (Stone, 2002, p. 314). With terrorism, once you name a certain group of people as
terrorists, they become the other. They are no longer like us and are perceived as evil, despicable
people who are capable of committing heinous acts. This may be true of terrorists themselves,
but it is not true of the larger group of people who have become associated with the term
terrorist, but the fact that politicians and the media consistently associate terrorists with Muslim
or Muslim looking people has resulted in them becoming synonymous with terrorist. These terms
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have negative connotations and serve to further put a target on people’s backs, which leads to
policies that directly impact the targeted group.

Existing Counterterrorism Policies and the Role of Perception
One of the most widely known counterterrorism policies is the 2001 Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act, more commonly referred to as the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act was enacted by
Congress to arm law enforcement with new tools to detect and prevent terrorism, after the events
of 9/11. This act was created to address the security concerns of the American public after 9/11,
but it was also an act that was created and implemented through an Islamophobic lens. The
Patriot Act aimed to improve counterterrorism efforts in the United States by allowing law
enforcement personnel to utilize higher forms of surveillance in terrorism investigations,
facilitating information sharing and cooperation among various government agencies to more
effectively coordinate their national security efforts, updating the law to reflect new technologies
and new threats by granting law enforcement agencies greater legal assistance, and increasing the
penalties for individuals who commit terrorism-related crimes (“The USA Patriot Act:
Preserving Life and Liberty”).
The Patriot Act was initiated in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and that is clear
through the language of the act itself which promoted the Islamophobic sentiment that
immediately occurred in the days after the attacks. It was an act created out of fear and the desire
for revenge on those who attacked the United States on its own soil. On the surface, the Patriot
Act appeared to be a good decision because widely increasing the powers afforded to law
enforcement agencies in matters concerning terrorism was designed to equip them with better
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tools to prevent future attacks. It was viewed as the most effective way to allow the United States
to better protect its citizens and their country, but in actuality, the act stripped many Americans
of their given rights. This can most clearly be seen through racial profiling. Racial profiling, as
defined by the ACLU, occurs when “law enforcement and private security target people of color
for humiliating and often frightening detentions, interrogations, and searches without evidence of
criminal activity and based on perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion” (“Racial
Profiling”). The practice of racial profiling is not unique to the post-9/11 years, but with the
enactment of the Patriot Act and associated legislation racial profiling that specifically targeted
Muslim or Muslim looking individuals greatly increased. The Patriot Act gave the United States
new powers to categorize Muslims and Muslim appearing Americans as a threat to national
security, which contributed to social segregation and differential access to resources, while also
designating them as a unique security threat to American citizens and national interests
(Considine, 2017). Through the powers designated to them in the Patriot Act, law enforcement
agencies effectively delegated Muslim Americans, and Muslim looking Americans, to the role of
second class citizenship. This group of people became subject to their freedoms and their safety
being taken away from them. The Patriot Act is only one example of how public perception of
Muslims resulted in punitive policies that negatively impacted this group of people.
Negative perceptions of terrorism and the individuals most commonly associated with
terrorism has influenced other public policies as well. For example, we have observed a dramatic
shift in policy related to terrorism with the election of Donald Trump as president of the United
States in 2016. Under the Obama Administration, counterterrorism efforts revolved around the
core values of the US, security partnerships, assuring the use of appropriate anti-terrorism tools,
and creating a culture of resilience within America (“Citizens’ Perceptions of Terrorism
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Risks…”). President Obama was greatly concerned with having counterterrorism strategies that
helped protect all Americans by observing and protecting their human rights. Obama was also
concerned with evaluating how effective counterterrorism strategies were, and worked towards
improving existing strategies and developing new strategies to keep the United States from
terrorist threats (“Citizens’ Perceptions of Terrorism Risks…”). When Donald Trump became
President, the focus on protecting human rights and using appropriate tools for counterterrorism
strategies went away.
President Trump released his administration’s versions of a counterterrorism strategy in
October of 2018. This strategy outlined four objectives included defeating global terrorist
networks and their affiliates, using all available US power to inhibit the ability of terrorists to
mobilize their fighters, finance operations, travel, communicate, and recruit new members,
protect critical infrastructure and educate the public on how to prepare and respond to attacks,
and to defeat radical Islamic terrorists by further expanding the number of tools available to law
enforcement agencies to fight terrorism (“Citizens’ Perceptions of Terrorism Risks…”). As with
the Patriot Act, these four objectives look great on paper, but in practice, they become incredibly
problematic. When expanding the powers of law enforcement agencies by using rhetoric such as
“all available US power”, it seems to suggest that America is willing to do anything necessary to
stop the threat of terrorism. However, using any means necessary often goes too far. In terms of
terrorism policy, employing any means necessary has often led to enhanced interrogation, racial
profiling, and victimization of Muslim and Muslim looking Americans. Using this rhetoric also
leads the public to think that they are under constant threat and that if punitive tactics are not
employed, then they will not be safe (Considine, 2017). This perception directly leads to the
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public supporting punitive policies because they think that they will be the safest with the use of
such policies that are targeting specific groups of people associated with the threat of terrorism.

The Push for Unbiased Counterterrorism Policies
In recent years, there has been a shift from these more punitive and racist
counterterrorism policies to a more community-based approach that relies on aspects of
procedural justice and positive community engagement. The United Kingdom and Australia have
spearheaded community counterterrorism efforts, but the United States has been beginning to
adopt more community-based counterterrorism approaches as well. This shift is occurring for a
variety of reasons, but the main reason is the fact that governments all around the world have
begun to realize that despite adopting increasingly invasive and controversial counterterrorism
policies in the post-9/11 era, they have been unable to legislate or police their way out of the
security threat posed by Islamic extremism to this day (Spalek & Weeks, 2016). In other words,
Western governments have begun to realize that engaging Muslim communities might be a more
effective way to combat the threat of terrorism than by using punitive and oppressive tactics that
are based on fear and revenge.
The development of community-based approaches to counterterrorism is a step in the
right direction, however, it is going to take a lot of work and require politicians, law enforcement
agencies, and the general public to change their perceptions of terrorism. The largest obstacle in
the way of community-based approaches will come from the fact that Muslim communities are
viewed as “suspect communities”. In 1993, the term suspect community was first used to
describe how the Northern Irish population was rendered as a suspect through the design and
operation of counterterrorism legislation that was enacted in Ireland during the Northern Irish
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conflict. Since the early 1990s, this term has been adopted to describe the contemporary situation
and experience of Muslim communities in the wake of 9/11. Scholars have also agreed that a
“suspect community is not simply one that is targeted but is also one that is imagined (socially
constructed by members of the non-suspect groups) through the broader discourse surrounding
the War on Terror” (Chereny & Murphy, 2016, p. 481). In order to effectively engage Muslim
communities to participate in counterterrorism efforts, viewing these communities as suspects
need to be overcome. One way that this can be overcome is by building partnerships with
Muslim communities. Engagement with these communities will allow the police to be able to
improve relations with Muslim community members who can then help them in the “repudiation
of terrorist propaganda and extremism, pass on terror-related information to police, and help in
the identification of violent extremists” (Cherney & Murphy, 2016, p. 481). However, this will
be easier said than done because the police will need to ensure they are striking a balance
between engaging with the Muslim community and using the Muslim community as a means to
their own counterterrorism ends.

Conclusion
Perceptions of terrorism and the groups most commonly associated with terrorism have
immense power to influence the creation and implementation of counterterrorism policies. It is
clear that there is an issue with many existing counterterrorism policies and security measures,
and these issues must be remedied. Existing counterterrorism policies are punitive and tend to
target Muslim and Muslim looking Americans. It is important going forward that
counterterrorism policies are created and implemented that do not feed into these perceptions of
Muslims automatically meaning terrorism. Individuals in all walks of life will need to realize that
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all Muslims are not terrorists and that the vast majority of Muslims denounce terrorism as much
as non-Muslims do. This is a paradigm shift that is going to take a lot of effort and cooperation
among politicians, law enforcement agencies, the media, and the general public to change the
narrative around terrorism and to make community-oriented counterterrorism policies a reality.
Counterterrorism policies need not be based on racial biases and preconceived notions of what it
means to be a terrorist, which is often detrimental towards Muslim and Muslim looking
individuals. It is so important to create and implement counterterrorism strategies that are not
based on an Islamophobic ideology because any group of people, no matter their ethnicity or
their religion, could become the victim of an attack and all groups of people have a right to be
protected.
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Introduction
Terrorism can be defined in many different ways, but for the purposes of this paper,
terrorism refers to the “premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational
groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience
beyond that of their immediate victims” (Avdan & Webb, 2018). Terrorism is an act that is
primarily associated with men who use violent acts to enhance a particular political agenda and
spread a particular ideology throughout the world. In the discussion of terrorism, women are
often an afterthought. Women are not typically considered in the discussion of terrorism because
many people, whether they are policymakers, the media, or the general public, believe that it is
unfathomable for a woman to want to engage in terrorism. It is true that men make up the
majority of terrorist organizations, but that does not dismiss the fact that women are among the
ranks of terrorist organizations as well. Depending on the organization, women have more
opportunities to be involved in the front lines of the fight with the men, while in other groups
they remain behind the scenes in support roles (Agara, 2015). Nevertheless, women have played
an important role in terrorist activities throughout history.
Women have, and continue to be, an essential part of terrorist organizations. Their roles
may have changed and evolved over the years, but in some capacity women have always played
a part. This is why it is so important to examine the roles that women play in terrorist
organizations. In terrorist organizations, women have played an active role through support roles
and other non-lethal terrorism tactics, but they have also been on the front lines of a terrorist
attack as well, engaging in violent fighting and suicide missions alongside men. To be a terrorist,
an individual does not only have to engage in violent acts of terrorism. Simply by supporting the
terrorist organization, one can be considered as a terrorist (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011).
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In terrorist organizations, women make up the vast majority of support positions. These
positions may not be as overtly terroristic as more violent tactics employed by terrorist
organizations, but without these support roles, the terrorist organization would not be able to
function. Support roles, such as obtaining information, helping with finances, and spreading
propaganda are all vital aspects of terrorism that help the terrorist organizations facilitate their
political agenda and achieve their objectives (Avdan & Webb, 2010). Without these vital roles,
often fulfilled by women, the terrorist organizations would not be as successful.
The literature on female involvement in terrorism is relatively lacking, and what does
exist tends to focus on women being manipulated, abused, and used by the men in their lives.
Much of female terrorism literature tends to look at female engagement in terrorism through their
connection to males, instead of viewing women as their own person capable of making the
decision to engage in terrorism for their own reasons. Scholars will typically link women’s
participation in terrorism to something bad that has happened to them in their past, such as abuse,
rape, drug use, loss of loved ones, and pressure from their brothers, boyfriends, or husbands, to
engage in terrorism (Agara, 2015). This is the most common theme and explanation for female
involvement in terrorism that is found in the existing literature, but some scholars have explored
other factors that draw women into terrorist organizations as well. For example, some scholars
note that females engage in terrorism as a way to reclaim themselves in the eyes of society.
When scholars discuss this reclamation, they are implying that women who engage in terrorism
can reclaim their lives from abuse, hardship, their lower-level position in society by creating a
way for them to move up the levels of the existing hierarchy and obtain more power for
themselves (Fink, Barakat, & Shetret, 2013). That being said, some literature reviews have
explored other factors that draw women into terrorist organizations.

52

The first half of this literature review will examine the existing literature on gender and
terrorism. The intent of examining the existing literature is to provide an understanding of the
reasons that women choose to engage in terrorism, and if female engagement differs from male
engagement. This section will provide background information for the second half of the paper.
Through an analysis of data produced by Moskalenko and McCauley (2009), the second half of
this paper will focus on answering this question: Are there gender differences behind the
motivation for joining and participating in terrorist organizations? My hypothesis is that there are
not gender differences between male and female motivation for joining and participating in a
terrorist organization.

Overview of the Existing Literature
Terrorism literature, no matter the specific focus, has a tendency to concentrate solely on
male engagement in terrorism and will typically ignore or diminish the role that women play in
terrorism. However, over the course of the last decade, there has been an increasing interest by
scholars regarding the involvement of women in terrorism. This interest includes how female
terrorists are portrayed in the media, their role in terrorism itself, and their role in
counterterrorism efforts. Agara (2015) is one scholar who focuses specifically on the
involvement of women in terrorism and terrorist organizations through the lens of media and
policymakers. In examining female engagement in terrorism in this way, Agara argues that the
media and policymakers have made women’s involvement in terrorism appear to be a recent
phenomenon, when in reality, women have played an active role in some way, shape, or form for
hundreds of years. Through viewing female engagement in terrorism as a new phenomenon, and
also through a gendered lens, terrorist organizations are given an edge to cause more damage in a
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terrorist incident because few expect that a woman is capable of causing mass amounts of
violence and destruction (Agara, 2015). Viewing women as incapable of causing mass amounts
of violence stems from societal stereotypes and media coverage that emphasizes the role of
women as innocent, loving caretakers.
Existing terrorism that discusses female involvement explores the role that women play
in counterterrorism. The counterterrorism literature that focuses on women largely analyzes the
United Nations and their efforts to increase female involvement in counterterrorism efforts. In
2013, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, an organization within the United
Nations, wrote a policy brief that highlights the importance of understanding the various terrorist
capacities in which women engage, and the need for women to play an active part in
counterterrorism efforts (Fink, Barakat, & Shetret, 2013). Scholars who emphasize the necessity
of women engaging in counterterrorism do so because they argue that the world is shifting from
a more reactive counterterrorism approach, to a more preventative counterterrorism approach.
This shift calls for a more comprehensive approach to addressing the new challenges of
terrorism, and one of these challenges is the gender component of terrorism. Developing a more
comprehensive approach to counterterrorism efforts would include a multi-stakeholder approach
that actively includes women in counterterrorism efforts, but also incorporates a gender
dimension overall into the United Nations and national counterterrorism efforts (Fink, Barakat,
& Shetret, 2013). Adding a female perspective to terrorism would better equip the international
community to understand why, how, and when women decide to engage in terrorism, and
develop new strategies to counteract their involvement.
Another approach to female involvement in counterterrorism efforts focuses on the role
of masculinity. A unique approach evident in the literature was a study conducted by Barnes,
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Brown, and Osterman (2012). These authors conducted a study to examine how masculine honor
ideology within the United States could potentially influence citizens’ response to terrorism. This
study was the first of its kind to look at the effects of masculinity and honor on terrorism.
Essentially, this study found evidence that the militant response to terrorism, which is the current
counterterrorism policy approach, is rooted in the culture of the United States and stems from the
emphasis on honor and the importance of masculinity in our society (Barnes, Brown, &
Osterman, 2012). This is an important consideration to keep in mind when examining how the
United States views terrorism and counterterrorism efforts. This reliance on masculinity and
honor can serve as one explanation for why women’s involvement in terrorism and
counterterrorism remains a foreign concept.
Besides focusing on how the media portrays female’s roles and involvement in terrorism
and women’s role in counterterrorism, some scholars focus on the limitations of the literature
itself. Corcoran-Nantes (2011) critiques the images and understanding of female terrorism that is
most commonly presented in the literature. Corcoran-Nantes (2011) is one of many who cite
limitations in the literature. Her specific focus is on examining the common themes that are
present in a gendered approach to terrorism, such as the literature that defines female
engagement in political violence as victims of male seduction, biological determinism, and
psychological issues. Corcoran-Nantes (2011) advocates, and is urging other scholars to do so, as
well, for the academic community to approach female engagement in terrorism through a lens
that prioritizes an understanding of women as individuals, citizens, and political actors, instead
of their connection to men and trauma that they may or may not have experienced (CorcoranNantes, 2011).
A key component of the literature concerning women in terrorism also emphasizes
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gender differences in fear of terrorism itself. It is thought by some in the literature that men and
women are afraid of different things, and when they are afraid of the same things, they may
respond to that fear in different ways. Nellis (2009) conducted an analysis to observe these
differences. Nellis (2009) analyzed data collected from a telephone survey of 532 inhabitants
from New York, and Washington, DC on the topic of reactions to terrorism-related information
to assess women’s fear of crime and their risk of victimization by examining differences in fear
of terrorism and their reaction to terrorism compared to men. The result of this study showed that
women reported greater amounts of fear of terrorism, and that they were far more likely to seek
information on how to prepare for terrorist attacks when compared to men. Nellis (2009) found
this difference to be statistically significant, and the results appear to suggest that there are key
differences in how males and females approach the topic of terrorism. The results of this study
are very interesting because Nellis (2009) found that there were statistically significant
differences between men and women in their reactions to terrorism, whereas most of the
literature suggests that there are no differences between men and women in regards to topics
relating to terrorism. When differences are present in the literature, differences are very minor or
are not statistically significant, but this article provides some support that statistically significant
differences appear to be correlated with gender.

Women in Terrorism
“Behind every act of terrorism lies a protagonist or perpetrator who is unmistakably
male” (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011, p.1). Even though the last decade has seen a noticeable increase
in the study of female terrorism, the sentiment behind this quote shows how gender is not
commonly discussed in the major works on the study of terrorism. Typically, terrorism is only
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discussed through a male-dominated lens, and when female terrorism is discussed, it is heavily
gendered and seemingly different and apart from all other forms of terrorism in which men
participate (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011). This has led some scholars to assert that women’s
association with terrorism requires a different kind of analysis to get at the root causes and
motivations for joining and participating in such an organization. Sjoberg (2009) is one such
scholar that demands that female engagement in terrorism be approached through a feminist lens.
Sjoberg (2009) argues that women are underrepresented in the study of terrorism because so few
scholars look at the reasons for women’s engagement in terrorism, and the consequences of
women’s actions in terrorism. Even when terrorism is explored in a female context, it frequently
characterizes female participants in terrorism as women terrorists, rather than terrorists who
happen to be women (Sjoberg, 2009). This point tries to highlight the fact that female terrorists
are seen through very gendered terms, instead of being seen as terrorists in their own right.
It is assumed that terrorist organizations are predominantly comprised of male
individuals, which is true, but this does not mean that women are nonexistent among their ranks.
The majority of the current literature on terrorist organizations diminishes the role that women
have played throughout history and the role that they continue to play today, in these
organizations. The roles women have played in terrorist organizations are viewed as ugly,
violent, and untraditional for their sex, but women assist in keeping the terrorist organization
alive. Women provide vital support for the organization through intelligence gathering, medical
care, food preparation, and support, which are seen as behind the scenes roles (Baker, 2017).
However, women have also been involved on the front lines in violent acts of terrorism as well.
Since the 1990s, and increasingly throughout the 2000s, women have been involved with
Islamist and Jihadi terrorist organizations. These are Islamic organizations that get their
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inspiration from a fundamental interpretation of the Quran. In these organizations, women
remain prevalent in behind the scenes roles, such as support personnel, logistics personnel, and
kinetic resources, but they have also become attackers, kidnappers, hijackers, and martyrs on the
frontlines of terrorism (Agara, 2015). The most common form of violent terrorism that females
engage in is suicide terrorism. It is one of the most violent forms of a terrorist attack, and women
are often utilized because of their ability to go undetected. Women are often viewed as pure,
innocent, and nonviolent by societal standards, and these stereotypes play into the advantage of
terrorist organizations. No one wants to violate a woman’s personal space by stopping,
searching, and interrogating her, which allows female terrorists to get close to their target
without issue (Oliverio & Lauderdale, 2005). Despite the advantages that women brought to the
table by being able to go undetected at higher rates than male terrorists, initially terrorist
organizations were reluctant to utilize female suicide attackers. Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and
other Islamic terrorist organizations were adamant that women should not participate in violent
demonstrations. These organizations believed that women should remain at home and perform
the traditional and well-established roles as wives and mothers while wearing traditional Islamic
clothing and rarely appearing in public unaccompanied by their husbands, uncles, or sons. In
2002, this sentiment changed when Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, gave his “Army of the Roses” speech, which called on women to join their
husbands, uncles, and sons in the struggle against Islam (Agara, 2015). This changed the role of
women in terrorist organizations from that moment on.
That same afternoon that Yasser Arafat was calling for women to do their part for their
organizations by taking up arms against their enemies, a Palestinian woman named Wafa Idris
made history as becoming the first female suicide bomber in the Palestinian setting. Idris was not
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the first female suicide bomber in history, but she is arguably one of the more famous female
attackers in the Islamic sphere of terrorism. This is because her suicide mission invoked a
visceral reaction from the public who were shocked and unwilling to admit that a female could
be a suicide attacker. The public was unable to grasp why a woman would want to partake in a
suicide mission and because of this, the media made every effort to dismiss Idris as mentally ill
or hopeless (Lindemann, 2015). Another notable woman in terrorism who put female
engagement in terrorism on the map was Leila Khaled. Khaled is the first known female
hijacker, who participated in a classic high profile airline-hijacking mission (Harmon & Holmes,
2017). Khaled’s attack took place in 1969 when she hijacked the Trans World Airlines Flight
840. It was believed that the Israeli ambassador to the United States was on board, but it was
later revealed that he was not. No one was injured during the hijacking, but Khaled and her
hijacking team blew up the nose section of the aircraft carrier once passengers disembarked
(Simkovitz, 2017). Women like Wafa Idris and Leila Khaled show the world that male terrorists
are not the only terrorists to fear. Women are equally capable of committing acts of terror in the
name of what they believe in.
When the incidents perpetrated by Wafa Idris and Leila Khaled were covered by the
media, they stated that these women were anomalies, ill, or manipulated into resorting to
terrorism by the men in their lives. This storyline became a common explanation for female
suicide bombers, hijackers, and female terrorists in general because the public was unable to
comprehend the idea that women would partake in martyrdom missions like men. Society did not
expect that women would engage in violence on this scale. The media attempted to clarify this
incomprehensible act by explaining female terrorism in the context of their mental, emotional, or
even genital deficiencies (Oliverio & Lauderdale, 2005). The media also portrayed female
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terrorists as biologically, psychologically, and sexually different from terrorist men, but also
different from non-terrorist women (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011). Coverage of this type is designed
to keep women in gendered and stereotypical roles of being nurturers and the weaker sex.
Currently, a knowledge gap exists for many policymakers concerning the motivations for
committing violent extremist acts and how gender may play a role. This knowledge gap stems
from the fact that women may play the role of supporter or participate in terrorist groups for
reasons outside of their gender. Many people believe that women engage in terrorism for
distinctly different reasons than men, but studies show that this is not necessarily the case.
Studies suggest that many of the factors that drive men to become terrorists drive women in the
same way. These factors include grievances about sociopolitical conditions, grief about the death
of a loved one, perceived humiliation on a physical, psychological, or political level,
commitment to religious or ideological beliefs, economic benefits, and/or the desire to effect
societal change (Fink, Barakat, & Shetret, 2013). However, there is still a belief that women
engage in terrorism for different reasons than men because of their differences in personality and
values. Whether or not there are fundamental differences between male and female involvement
in terrorism, it is important to analyze the role that women play in both preventing and engaging
in terrorism. To obtain a better understanding of terrorism and how to combat it, the gender
element must be explored.

Women in Counterterrorism
Women not only engage in terrorism, but they also engage in counterterrorism. Terrorism
itself is male-dominated, and the same is true for counterterrorism efforts in many countries. In
recent years, there has been a push by the international community to increase the involvement
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of women in counterterrorism efforts. This effort is being led by the United Nations. The call for
an increase in female involvement in counterterrorism is happening for a variety of reasons. The
main reason is that little attention has been paid to integrating a gender dimension in the efforts
to address terrorism and violent extremism. In 2010, the United Nations adopted Security
Council Resolution 1325 and established the United Nations Women to promote gender equality
and empowerment through providing a multilateral platform for highlighting issues relating to
armed conflict, insecurity, and inequality and their effect on women (Fink, Barakat, & Shetret,
2013). These resolutions and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security focus on
how women are typically viewed as preventers, without considering why, how, and when women
may also play the role of supporter or perpetrator in terrorism, or as security personnel in
counterterrorism efforts.
From participants to preventers, women play an essential role in both sides of the
terrorism spectrum. Since women are often viewed as the weaker sex, this presents many
challenges for them to be taken seriously. In the context of counterterrorism, women constantly
have to fight for legitimacy to be seen as competent leaders. In matters of national security,
women tend to be less preferred in leadership roles than men. This is because female politicians
are viewed as stereotypically more compassionate and trustworthy, are better equipped to handle
children’s and women’s issues, and are typically more liberal and democratic, whereas males are
viewed as stronger, more assertive, leaders who are more competent at handling matters of
national security (Holman, Merolla, & Zeichmeister, 2016). This means that women have a
harder time making their voices heard in counterterrorism matters. This is very detrimental to
counterterrorism efforts because women have the potential to bring their unique perspectives to
counterterrorism efforts. If women’s voices and perspectives were heard on a larger scale, it is
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possible that counterterrorism policies could be created with a gender component in mind that
would allow policymakers to obtain a better understanding of female motives for engagement in
terrorism, which in turn would allow for policymakers to create and adopt policies to decrease
female engagement in terrorism.

Data Analysis
In order to observe whether or not there are gender differences in the motivation for
joining and participating in terrorist organizations, data from Clark McCauley’s (2011)
“Predictors of Activism and Radicalism: Past Activism, Past Radicalism, and Grievance Against
the Government” will be utilized. McCauley (2011) focused on testing the relationship between
grievance, activism, and radicalism, among 429 participants from throughout the United States.
These participants were gathered and randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions.
The first group was given questions about their intention to engage in activism and radicalism in
the past and the future, followed by questions regarding grievances against the United States
government. The second group was given the questions about grievances against the US
government first, followed by the activism and radicalism questions. These questions were
designed to determine the effect that past behavior may have on future behavior to engage in
activism and/or radicalism. This study included variables on demographics, future/past activism,
grievances with the United States government, and attitudes towards law enforcement within the
United States.
Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) utilized the aforementioned dataset to examine how
the increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict
affect political mobilization. They built upon previous research to introduce the Activism and
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Radicalism Intention Scales, which are used to asses an individual’s readiness to participate in
legal and non-violent political action. They also used the Radicalism Intention Scale to assess the
readiness of an individual to participate in illegal or violent political actions. They used these two
scales as an analysis tool to conduct three separate studies to measure political mobilization. The
study of most importance for this paper is Study 3. In this study, Moskalenko and McCauley
(2009) applied a two-component structure of the activism and radicalism intention scales that
were used in the first two studies, but in this study, they use a sample that is representative of the
adult population within the United States. For this particular study, they determined that
American respondents are not usually suspicious of social scientists or researchers, so they added
questions about participants’ past experiences with activism and/or radicalism. For this paper, I
will be referencing this study and analyzing this data set to see whether gender plays a significant
role in the decision to engage in activism or radicalism. I will be taking into account the
differences in male and female responses to the questions designed by the original author.

Methods
Utilizing Clark McCauley’s (2011) “Predictors of Activism and Radicalism: Past
Activism, Past Radicalism, and Grievance Against the Government” national data set (N-429), a
series of independent sample t-tests and a cross tabs analysis were conducted to observe
differences between male and female responses to the questionnaire developed by McCauley
(2011). The questions asked in this survey were on a Likert scale ranging from very unlikely,
unlikely, likely, and very likely. For this analysis, the scale was kept the same. This analysis will
be conducted using SPSS (2017), a statistical programming software. A total of 18 questions will
be examined. Each question is related to a participant’s willingness to engage in activism or
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radicalism on behalf of the political group that they support. Some of the questions ask if
participants have had negative experiences with the United States government. These questions
are asked to see if the participants have any grievances towards the United States government,
and to observe if these grievances could influence a participant’s decision to engage in activism
or radicalism.

Results
The authors of the original data set asked male and female participants a series of
eighteen questions. For this literature review, a t-test and a chi square test were conducted on
each of the eighteen questions to see if there are any statistically significant differences between
male and female engagement in activism and/or radicalism, which can then be applied to
terrorism. The original authors who used this data observed that there were no statistically
significant differences between male and female participants’ responses to the questions, but it is
important to note that there were observed differences in the raw data. Despite these differences,
the data supports the hypothesis that there are no statistically significant differences between
male and female motivations for joining and participating in a terrorist organization.
Table One below reports the results from the t-tests that were conducted. As can be seen
in the table, Questions 8, 12, and 14 report distinguishable means for male and female responses.
Table Two featured below reports the results from the chi square test that was conducted with the
data. The chi square test results are interesting because they show that four of the eighteen
questions display statistically significant differences between male and female respondents,
while the t-test comparisons only report that there are three questions that report statistically
significant differences. Both the t-tests and chi square tests show that Questions 8, 12, and 14 are
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statistically significant, but the chi square test also shows that Question 5 reports that there are
statistically significant differences in the participant’s answers. Table Three provides the results
by question, male mean score, female mean score, and the differences in the means for each
question. Of the eighteen questions asked of participants, males had a higher mean score in eight
questions, and females had a higher mean score in eight questions. In three of the eighteen
questions, the means were statistically significant, but in the other fifteen questions, the means
were not statistically significant. Question 8, Question 12, and Question 14 produced statistically
significant results. It is important to note that in all of the tables, the questions have been
abbreviated. A list of the full eighteen questions in their unabbreviated form can be found in
Appendix A.
In Table One below, questions 8, 12, and 14 show distinguishable means for male and
female responses based on the results of the independent t-test. These three questions show that
there are statistically significant differences associated with the gender of the respondent. There
were statistically significant differences between men and women when asked if they would
retaliate against an opposing group (p = .017), organize a political event (p = .016), and if they
would engage in a political activity with the possibility of confrontation (p = .026).
Table Two below shows that there are statistically significant differences between male
and female respondents, based on the results of the chi square test, in 4 of the 18 questions.
Similarly to Table One, Table Two reports statistically significant differences between males and
females responses in questions 8, 12, and 14, but the chi square test also reports statistically
significant differences for question 5 as well. Statistically significant differences between men
and women were observed when they were asked if they would continue supporting your
organization even if they break the law (p = .037), if they would retaliate against an opposing
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group (p = .014), organize a political event (p = .016), and if they would engage in a political
activity with the possibility of confrontation (p = .026).
Table One: T-Test Comparisons for Gender (N=429), *p<.05
Question
Male
Male
Female
Mean
Standard
Mean
Score
Deviation
Score
(n=223)
(n=206)
Q1: Join an organization
2.51
.964
2.46
that fights for your group’s
political and legal rights?
Q2: Donate money?)
2.56
.923
2.62
Q3: Volunteer your time?
2.44
.913
2.48
Q4: Travel ten miles to join
2.30
.985
2.27
a public rally,
demonstration, or protest?
Q5: Continue supporting
1.99
.977
1.84
your organization even if
they break the law?
Q6: Participate in a protest
1.79
.873
1.74
if it might get violent?
Q7: Attack police for
1.62
.868
1.54
beating members of your
group?
Q8: Retaliate against an
1.63
.834
1.46
opposing group?
Q9: Attend a talk?
1.53
.500
1.60
Q10: Invite a friend to an
1.53
.450
1.77
event?
Q11: Distribute
1.70
.460
1.74
information?
Q12: Organize a political
1.89
.316
1.95
event?
Q13: Engage in a political
1.93
.251
1.96
activity with the possibility
of confrontation? (P= .201)
Q14: Engage in an illegal
1.95
.208
1.99
act as part of a political
protest?
Q15: Has the US
1.64
.843
1.55
government wronged you?
Q16: Has the US
1.74
.830
1.86
government wronged a
group you belong too?

Female
Standard
Deviation

Sig.

.881

p=.556

.918
.879
.908

p=.497
p= .675
p= .690

.820

p= .084

.744

p= .554

.723

p= .271

.659

p=.017*

.492
.424

p= .170
p= .263

.442

p= .398

.215

p=.016*

.195

p=.201

.098

p=.026*

.823

p= .259

.865

p= .165
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Q17: Would you cooperate
with the FBI?
Q18: Would you work for a
law enforcement agency?

1.90

.826

1.88

.863

p= .822

2.41

1.302

2.66

1.293

p= .051

Table Two: Chi Square Test Results (N= 429)
Male n = 223 and Female n = 206
Question
Q1: Join an organization that fights for your
group’s political and legal rights?
Q2: Donate money?
Q3: Volunteer your time?
Q4: Travel ten miles to join a public rally,
demonstration, or protest?
Q5: Continue supporting your organization
even if they break the law? *
Q6: Participate in a protest if it might get
violent?
Q7: Attack police for beating members of your
group?
Q8: Retaliate against an opposing group? *
Q9: Attend a talk?
Q10: Invite a friend to an event?
Q11: Distribute information?
Q12: Organize a political event? *
Q13: Engage in a political activity with the
possibility of confrontation?
Q14: Engage in an illegal act as part of a
political protest? *
Q15: Has the US government wronged you?
Q16: Has the US government wronged a group
you belong too?
Q17: Would you cooperate with the FBI?
Q18: Would you work for a law enforcement
agency?
*p<.05

Value
3.82

Degrees of
Freedom
3

Asymptotic
Significance
.284

1.083
.701
5.695

3
3
3

.781
.873
.127

8.464

3

.037*

7.002

3

.072

5.490

3

.139

10.640
1.887
1.260
.719
5.774
1.645

3
1
1
1
1
1

.014*
.169
.262
.396
.016*
.200

4.931

1

.026*

2.283
2.160

2
2

.319
.340

2.027
4.540

3
3

.567
.209
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Table Three: Mean Scores by Gender (N=429)
Question
Male
Female
Mean
Mean
Score
Score
(n=223)
(n=206)
Q1: Join an organization that
2.51
2.46
fights for your group’s political
and legal rights?
Q2: Donate money?
2.56
2.62
Q3: Volunteer your time?
2.44
2.48
Q4: Travel ten miles to join a
2.30
2.27
public rally, demonstration, or
protest?
Q5: Continue supporting your
1.99
1.84
organization even if they break
the law?
Q6: Participate in a protest if it
1.79
1.74
might get violent?
Q7: Attack police for beating
1.62
1.54
members of your group?
Q8: Retaliate against an opposing
1.63
1.46
group?
Q9: Attend a talk?
1.53
1.60
Q10: Invite a friend to an event?
1.53
1.77
Q11: Distribute information?
1.70
1.74
Q12: Organize a political event?
1.89
1.95
Q13: Engage in a political
1.93
1.96
activity with the possibility of
confrontation?
Q14: Engage in an illegal act as
1.95
1.99
part of a political protest?
Q15: Has the US government
1.64
1.55
wronged you?
Q16: Has the US government
1.74
1.86
wronged a group you belong too?
Q17: Would you cooperate with
1.90
1.88
the FBI?
Q18: Would you work for a law
2.41
2.66
enforcement agency?

Mean
Difference

Percentage
Difference

.053

2.00%

-.060
-.036
.037

2.29%
1.45%
1.61%

1.51

7.59%

.047

2.63%

.086

5.31%

.174

10.67%

-.066
-.048
-.037
-.064
-.028

4.13%
2.71%
2.13%
3.28%
1.43%

-.036

1.81%

.091

5.55%

-.115

6.18%

.018

0.95%

-.246

9.25%
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Discussion
Even though there were observed gender differences in how males and females
responded to the eighteen questions that they were asked, these differences were not statistically
significant in the majority of cases. However, as the results of the t-tests show, there were 3
instances of statistical significance and as the chi square tests show, there were 4 cases of
statistical significance. These results show that the hypothesis that there are no gender
differences between male and female motivation for joining and participating in a terrorist
organization is mildly supported. As the 3 to 4 instances of statistically significant results in this
sample, the differences between males and females in their motivation for joining and
participating in a terrorist organization is probably very weak.
Even though there are only a few instances of statistically significant results, the
differences observed in male and female respondents answers are important to consider. These
differences are especially important because when females had a greater mean score than males,
it was often on questions that are more stereotypically associated with females. The questions in
which female participants responded with a higher mean score than male participants are often
important to consider because these questions were more often related to non-violent support
roles that a female may engage in while participating in a terrorist organization. For example,
female mean scores were higher for questions that involved volunteering their time, donating
money, attending a talk, inviting a friend to group events, and organizing events for their
organization. These roles are often viewed as things that women would enjoy more than men, so
it was interesting to see these stereotypical associations play out in the data. Support roles within
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terrorist organizations are predominantly made up of female terrorists, so it is interesting that
women are seemingly more drawn to these types of roles, even though their responses were not
statistically significant for the majority of the questions, but were statistically significant for
Questions 12 and 14. These results can be seen more clearly in Table Four below. The scores
highlighted in yellow in this table signify that female respondents have a higher mean score than
male respondents.
Table Four: Gender Mean Scores (N=429)
Question
Q1: Join an organization that fights for your group’s
political and legal rights?
Q2: Donate money?
Q3: Volunteer your time?
Q4: Travel ten miles to join a public rally,
demonstration, or protest?
Q5: Continue supporting your organization even if
they break the law?
Q6: Participate in a protest if it might get violent?
Q7: Attack police for beating members of your
group?
Q8: Retaliate against an opposing group?
Q9: Attend a talk?
Q10: Invite a friend to an event?
Q11: Distribute information?
Q12: Organize a political event?
Q13: Engage in a political activity with the
possibility of confrontation?
Q14: Engage in an illegal act as part of a political
protest?
Q15: Has the US government wronged you?
Q16: Has the US government wronged a group you
belong too?
Q17: Would you cooperate with the FBI?
Q18: Would you work for a law enforcement agency?

Male Mean
Score
(n=223)
2.51

Female Mean Score
(n=206)

2.56
2.44
2.30

2.62
2.48
2.27

1.99

1.84

1.79
1.62

1.74
1.54

1.63
1.53
1.53
1.70
1.89
1.93

1.46
1.60
1.77
1.74
1.95
1.96

1.95

1.99

1.64
1.74

1.55
1.86

1.90
2.41

1.88
2.66

2.46

Conclusion
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Many aspects of terrorism have been actively explored since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
One area that has received less of a focus in the literature is the role that gender plays in terrorist
organizations. It is assumed that terrorist organizations are male dominated because females
would have no real interest in being a part of a terrorist organization. However, that is not the
case. Terrorist organizations are in fact male dominated, but female involvement in terrorism has
steadily been increasing. Women engage in terrorism by filling vital support roles that keep the
terrorist organization up and running, but they can also be on the front line with their male
counterparts, engaging in acts of violence. Ignoring female involvement in terrorism is
detrimental for the larger study of terrorism, and the creation and implementation of
counterterrorism strategies. This detriment is exacerbated by the fact that many people still
believe that female terrorists are an aberration, and that they engage in terrorism for
fundamentally different reasons than their male counterparts. However, as the literature and this
data analysis shows, women engage in terrorism for many of the same reasons that men do.
There is no strong statistically significant support that shows that there are differences between
males and females decision to engage in terrorism.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire Questions Asked by Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) in their
Original Data Collection and Analysis
Q1: Join an organization that fights for your group’s political and legal rights?
Q2: Donate money to an organization that fights for your group’s political and legal
rights?
Q3: Volunteer your time working (write petitions, distribute flyers, recruit people, etc.)
for an organization that fights for your group’s political and legal rights?
Q4: Travel ten miles to join a public rally, demonstration, or protest in support of your
group?
Q5: Continue supporting an organization that fights for your group’s political and legal
rights even if the organization sometimes breaks the law?
Q6: Participate in a protest against oppression of your group if you thought the protest
might turn violent?
Q7: Attack police or security forces if you saw them beating members of your group?
Q8: Retaliate against members of a group if some of that group attacked your group,
even if you could not be sure you were retaliating against the guilty parties?
Q9: Attended a talk on a particular group’s social or political concerns?
Q10: Invited a friend or relative to attend a meeting of a political organization or event?
Q11: Distributed information representing a particular political or social group’s cause?
Q12: Organized a political event (e.g. talk, discussion group, march)?
Q13: Engaged in a political activity in which you suspected there would be a
confrontation with the police, or possible arrest?
Q14: Engaged in an illegal act as part of a political protest?
Q15: Has the United States government done anything that hurt you personally or
someone you know?
Q16: Has the United States government done anything that hurt a group or a cause that
you care about?
Q17: If the FBI came to ask you for information about a neighbor or coworker, would
you answer their questions?
Q18: Which would you personally rather work for? (Not asked, refused, the FBI, the
State Police in your state, the local police force where you live, or I would never work for
any kind of law enforcement agency)
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